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The concept of Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium has received a renewed attention in the
recent years, due notably to its application to security questions [1]. In Stackelberg games, it
is assumed that one of the players, called the Leader, commits to a strategy. The other player,
called the Follower, learns or observes this strategy, and reacts rationally to it. The game being
with complete information, the Leader is able to predict the reaction of the follower, and is
then able to optimize her strategy to maximize her own rewards. It may be that the follower’s
response is not unique, in which case this prediction of the leader is not possibly anymore. A
strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) occurs when the Follower breaks such ties in favor of the
Leader: she chooses the best option to for the Leader among the best ones for her.
Initially defined in static games, this concept has been extended to inifinite-horizon, discoun-
ted dynamic games. Calculating dynamic SSE in such games within the set of general strategies
appears to be very difficult in general [2], with the feature that stationary strategies are sub-
optimal in general [3]. With the hope of reducing this complexity, as well memory storage
for the strategies, many authors concentrate on stationary feedback policies. Even in this
restricted class, the problem is still NP-Complete to compute in general [2] and several algo-
rithms based on Mathematical Programming have been proposed in the literature for solving
or approximating this problem [3].
In this paper, we study an alternative approach, inspired from the classical operator theory
for Markov Decision Processes or Zero-Sum Nash Games. Our contribution is as follows: we
first define a dynamic programming operator T corresponding to one-step strong Stackelberg
games with a scrap value. Fixed-Point Equilibria (FPE) are defined as fixed points of T . The
Value Iteration algorithm is defined as the iterations of T until convergence.
We illustrate through examples that FPE do not always exist. When they do, convergence
of Value Iteration may or may not occur. When it does, the result is not necessarily a dynamic
SSE. Nevertheless, we present sufficient conditions for a FPE to exist, and to coincide with a
SSE.1
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